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interpretation of a contract should be determined according to the laws of
the state where the contract is made, 1° contending that the obligation to
support is. not a matured contract, but a continuing liability.
Most authorities maintain that the statute of a foreign, jurisdiction should
be enforced, if doing so would not be against public policy.'' While in the
instant case the Texas Court was of the opinion that the California. statute
was not repugnant to the public policy of Texas, it appears that in some in-
stances such statutes are of such nature as to be contrary to the public policy
of another state. Statutes requiring an adult child to support his indigent
parents vary as to the financial need of the parent, 1'2 the past and present
conduct of the parent,1"' the martial condition of the daughter,14 and the
financial ability of the child to support the parent.1 5
There is a great difference in the laws of the various states which make
the adult child responsible for the support of his indigent parent, as well as
in the administration of these laws. Due to these differences it appears that
the action of the National Conference on Uniform Laws in amending section
7 of the Uniform Reciprocal Support Act was sound in providing that the
laws of the state in which thle obligor lives should apply in support cases.
The majority decision in the instant case was in accordance with this amended
act and appears to be sound from the standpoint of public policy as well as
legal precedent.
MERVIN A. TUNTLAND.
DAMAGES- INJUtRY TO THE PERSON OF ANOTHER- RECOVERY DENIED FOR
SHocK RESULTING FROM OBSERVATION OF INJURIES TO HUSBAND.- Plaintiff
10. See Holder v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 81 (1898); Baxter Nat'l Bank v. Talbot, 154
Mass. 213, 28 N.E. 163 (1891).
11. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cix, 145 U. S. 593 (1892); Howarth v. Loaibard, 175
Mass. 570, 56 N.E. 888 (1900); Corrington v. Crosby, 54. N. D. 615, 210 N.W. 342
(1920).
12. In many states the test for family responsibility is the same as the test for need
of public assistance. See Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under tho American Poor
Laws, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 514 (1956).
13. In the absence of statute, nisconduct by a parent does not ordinarily relieve the
child of the responsibility of support. See Hummel v. Hummel, 22 N.Y.S.2d 977 (N.Y.
Dom. Rel. Ct. 1940). In that case a son was compelled to contribute to the support of
his father who drank excessively. Gen. Code of Ohio § 12431, Rev. Code § 2901.4
provides that no person shall be required to support his parent, if the parent refused or
neglected to support him while he was under sixteen years of age.
14. A son-in-law is not liable for the support of his wife's parents; and unless she
has an income of her own, a married woman is not usually held liable for the support
of her indigent parents. In Commonwealth v. Goldman,., 179 Pa. Super. 521, 118 A.2d
271 (1955), the court held that a married daughter with a three year old child whose
husband received $7,500 per year did not have to, contribute to the support of her in-
digent parents. In Dunway v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 174 Misc. 735, 22 N.Y.S.2d
69 (Co. Ct. 1940), the ceurt held that a daughter receiving $300 per month alimony for
the support of herself and child was not required to contribute to the support of her in-
digent father. But see Moore v. Palen, 228 Minn, 148, 36 N.W.2d 540 (1949), where
damages were awarded to the parents of a married woman ,on the basis of her potential
ability to contribute to their support.
15. In Mendelson v. Mendelson, 192 Misc. 1014, 80.N.Y.S.2d 913 (N.Y. Dons. Rel.
Ct. 1948), a 27 year old unmarri-d daughter earning $30 per week and contributing the
major portion of the support of he divorced mother, was ordered to contribute $4.30
per month to the support of her father. In some states the minimum earnings which an
adult child must have before beiig held liable for the support of an indigent parent. is
determined by statute. See Mont. Rev. Code Ann. i§ 411.425 (1953). The Oregon
Code provides a graduated scale e liability for support, depending upon income and
number of dependents in the immediate family of the adult child. A married man with
a wife and two children would not be liable to contribute if the net as established for
income tax purposes is less than $5,000 per year.
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sustained a miscarriage as a result of mental shock and fright caused by her
observation of a collision between an automobile driven by her husband and
one driven negligently by the defendant. The District Court of Appeals, Third
District, California, held that injuries sustained from shock or fear at the
sight of another's peril aro not compensable. Reed v. Moore, 319 P.2d 80,
(Cal. 1957).
It is generally held that one may not recover for emotional distress which
results from observing a threat of or actual injury to a third person although
there exists an immediate family relationship.l A few isolated cases have al-
lowed recovery in such situations, but no doctrine has been formulated which
stands as a persuasive precedent.-
Recovery is denied on three grounds: (1) failure to find a duty owed by
the defendant to the particular plaintiff;-', (2) failure to ascertain proximate
cause; 4 (3) fear of fraudulent claim and increased litigation. 5
North Dakota does not have decision on the question, but the Supreme
Court has impliedly required "physical injury" to the plaintifft and presum-
ably would deny recovery where injuries arise out of fear for another.
It is submitted that recovery should be allowed for emotional distress em-
anating from a defendant's negligence toward a third person provided the
action is restricted so as not to leave the defendant's liability boundless,
7
such as limiting the cause of action to members of the immediate family.'
In addition, the injury threatened or inflicted should be sufficiently disturbing
1. Preece v. Baur, 143 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Idaho 1956); Resavage v. Davies, 199
Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); V/aube v.,Warrington, 216 Vis. 603, 258 N.W. 497
(1935); Restatement, Torts, (1938) Caveat to 313: "The Institute expresses no opinion
as to whether an actor whose conduct is negligent as involving an unreasonable risk of
causing bodily hrar to a child or spouse is liable for an illness or other bodily harm
caused to the parent of spouse who witnesses the peril or harm of the child or spouse
and thereby suffers anxiety or shock which is the legal cause of the parent's or spouse's
illness or other bodily harm."
2. Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912), cert. denied, 4 Ala. 677,
58 So. 1038 (1912), where it was held proper to permit the plaintiff to prove that
her children were in danger and that she was frightened for their safety, the court say-
ing only that: "This fact was part of the situation properly to be taken into account in
considering the effect upon the plaintiff of such an occurance." Lone Star Gas, Co. v.
Haire, 41 S.W.2d 424. (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), plaintiff included statement that at time
of accident "she was 'riding with her young daughter for whose safety she greatly
feared as well as her own, and such fact added to the severe shock to her nervous
system." The court overruled without explanation an exception by the defendant to this
statement as "improper, inflammatory, and prejudicial". Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., I
K.B. 141-CA (1925), wtes considered for many years the leading case allowing recov-
cry and was criticized by many courts denying recovery. See, e.g., Waube v. Warring-
ton, supra note 1. However, in Hay v. Young, AC 92 (1943), 2 All Eng. 396 (1942),
the same court resorted to the argiment that in Hambrook v. Stokes Bros. the defendant
had admitted a breach of duty directly to the plaintiff by his general admission of negli-
gence in his answer and thus deprived the case of authority.
3. Minkus v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 44 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Cal. 1942); Sander-
son v. Northern Pac. By., 88 Minn. 162, 92 N.W. 542 (1902); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H.
174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950):, "Such consequences are an unusual and extraordinary result
of the careless operation of an automobile and to impose liability therefor would place an
unreasonable burden ,upon users of the highways"; Gulf, C. & S. F. By. v. Overton, 101
Tex. 583, 110 S.W. 736 (1908). Compare with Gulf, C. & S. F. By. v. Coopwood, 96
S.W. 102 (Tex. Civ App. 1906) where recovery was allowed on basis of contract on
similar facts.
4. Angst v. Great Northern ly., 131 F. Supp. 156 (D.C. Minn. 1955); Carey v.
Pure Distributing Corp, 133 Tex. 3J, 124 S.W.2d 847 (1939).
5. 19 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1933).
6. See Wilson v. Northern Pac. fy., 30 N. D. 456,153 N.W. 429 (1915).
7. See Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
8. Cf., Wesern Union Tel. Co. v. Watson, 161 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
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or of a nature to cause shock to the plaintiff.9 Finally, as a third prere-
quisite, the plaintiff should recever only for fright or mental anguish suffer-
ed at the time of the mishap and not for consequential injuries arising later.' 0
Such a restriction of the right of action would alleviate the court's fear of
increased litigation. Of course this policy reason is not present and recovery
is granted, where the shock is caused by an intentional act of the defendant.'
Modern achievements in medicine make it possible in most cases to distin-
guish valid from fraudulent claims.
1 2
The shock of a mother at the sight of her child in danger or that of a
wife present at her husband's negligent death is real and raises human sym-
pathies in favor of recovery against the negligent defendant, 1 3 and within
the above restrictions recovery should be allowed.
WILLIAM F. HODNY.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS- SUBJECTS OF DECLARATORY RELIEF- SUIT BY
INSURER TO DETERMINE DUTY TO DEFEND ON AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY.
-Defendant was sued for damages arising out of an automobile accident
allegedly due to his intoxication. Before termination of that suit, plaintiff
brought this action for a declaratory judgment to have its rights determined
as insurer under a contract with defendant. The insurance policy contained
a clause suspending coverage when the car was operated by a driver "under
the influence of alcohol". The Supreme Court of Utah, one justice dissenting
in part, held that this was a proper action for a declaratory judgment. Utah
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957).
A suit for declaratory judgment is proper where there is an actual and
justicable controversy.' A controversy between an insurer and the insured as
to the existence or extent of liability to injured persons by the insurer under
the policy is the proper subject of a declaratory judgment.2 The same is true
where the parties seek to determine the insurer's duty to defend the insured. :
However, this presupposes the fact that the insurance company is not a party
to another action where the same facts and same parties are involved.4 In
9. Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minm. 90, 30 N.W. 435 (1886); Norris v. Southern Ry.,
84 S.C. 15, 65 S.E. 956 (1909).
10. See Kalleg v. Fassio, 125 Cal. App. 96, 13 P.2d 763 (1932).
11. Recovery has been allowed where the defendant commits a willful wrong toward
a third person although no bodily injury accompdnies the mental anguish and the plain-
tiff's person is not threatened. Alabama Fuel & 1. Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73
So. 205 (1916); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). Mental distress
caused by negligent threats or actual injury to property is not compensable. State v.
Baltimore Transit Co., 197 Md. 528, 80 A.2d 13, (1951). But if defendant's conduct
is willful recovery may be allowed. Cf., Bryson v. Phelps, 23 Ala. App. 346, 125 So.
795, cert. denied, 220 Ala. 389, 125 So. 798 (1929).
12. 19 Albany L. Rev. 320 (1955).
13. Prosser, Torts, § 37, (2d ed. 1955).
1. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270 (1941); G. W.
Jones Lumber Co. v. City of Marmarth, 67 N. D. 309, 272 N.W. 190 (1937); N. D.
Rev. Code § 32-2306 (1943); See Langer v. State, 69 N.D. 129, 284 N.W. 238
(1939), in which the court held that a declaratory judgment would not be given where
there was no "actual, justiciable controversy", and what was sought was merely an "ad-
visory opinion."
2. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Cochrane, 155 Ohio St. 305, 98 N.E.2d 840 (1951);
cf., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1937).
3. Reed v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N. Y., 254 Ala. 473, 48 So.2d 773 (1950); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Skuluzacek, 208 Minn. 443, 294 N.W. 413 (1940); New
Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Kirschenbaum, 194 Misc. 104, 85 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
4. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U. S. 491 (1942); Hudson v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
145 Kan. 732, 67 P.2d 593 (1937).
